Academic lists the potential outcomes if the Tak Bai case is not resolved

With the dust settling on the Tak Bai incident on which the statute of limitations is about to expire, security analyst and scholar Professor Emeritus Surachat Bumrungsuk explores the implications for the situation on the southern border.

- The political situation reached a critical point yesterday (October 24), with the Deputy Prime Minister for Security, the Minister of Defence, the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, and the Commander of the Fourth Army Area all summoned to explain their positions to the parliamentary committee. This is significant, as it was the last day before the case concluded, with considerable political implications for both the government and the military.

- The Tak Bai case reflects political encroachment, forcing southern issues into parliamentary discussions, despite previous calls from insurgent groups to elevate the southern problems to a national agenda that have not materialised.

- Many anticipate that the likelihood of all defendants appearing in court is low, which could be used as an excuse by insurgent groups to carry out violent acts symbolically as a form of protest. Such violence is likely to occur on the night the court announces the case (either today or on October 28).

- If it is assessed that the likelihood of violent acts by insurgents is high, the Fourth Army Area may need to hasten the implementation of a crisis response plan and establish measures to protect key locations in the area from armed attacks, bombings, and the use of explosive vehicles. Additionally, there should be a focus on protecting vulnerable targets, such as safeguarding the lives and property of civilians who lack self-defence capabilities.

- However, in practice, the preventive measures may not be straightforward. As is well known, the state cannot maintain a full military presence in the area, and the three southern border provinces contain numerous potential sites for attacks. Furthermore, insurgent groups have a considerable degree of freedom to move within familiar local territories. Nevertheless, the Fourth Army Area must adhere to the essential principle of reducing and limiting the potential violence as much as possible.

- The ongoing incidents consistently demonstrate an intent to target the lives of security personnel, particularly military officials. The deaths of these officers are often portrayed as a representation of the success of insurgent operations. Therefore, establishing ‘Force Protection’ measures, similar to those implemented by Western armies, is a critical issue that commanders should prioritise.

- It is interesting to note that regarding the Tak Bai issue, insurgent groups may organize large units to attack military forces in the area, as seen in the case of Krue Se (April 2004), or they may employ scatter tactics by dispatching small units to conduct operations simultaneously at multiple locations, which has occurred several times and has had a significant visual impact.

- While the violent acts are military, their consequences carry political dimensions. Simply by creating a narrative around attacks by insurgent groups linked to the Tak Bai case, they achieved success in political advertising. Implicitly, the imagery of military operations by insurgents disseminated across various media represents a political war in itself. The government and security agencies must be aware of this dimension, especially given that these images contribute to a political conflict in the online world (as evidenced by armed groups in the Middle East).

- If the case is concluded without the defendants appearing in court, it is not difficult to predict that protests will surely follow, likely mobilising significant numbers of participants. Particularly, this could involve leveraging networks of young people and various allies, leading to the expansion of the protest narrative surrounding the Tak Bai case, which will inevitably be utilised to create political outcomes.

- The Fourth Army Area must establish clear directives not to disperse the protests, as doing so could result in clashes and lead to casualties among demonstrators. This would create a scenario akin to “Tak Bai 2”, generating negative images for both the government and the Thai military, which could be exploited for political propaganda. If a situation like Tak Bai 2 occurs, it could represent a significant turning point for the Thai state in the southern region.

- Officials must be patient when facing the protests, as the lessons learned from Tak Bai are self-evident: they must avoid creating situations that lead to clashes and casualties.

- The government needs to boldly demonstrate leadership by clarifying the Tak Bai issue of 2004 and its ongoing ramifications in the present day. This problem encompasses both security contexts in the area and political contexts in Bangkok. Failing to address this issue by merely buying time will inevitably make the government a defendant in the public eye.

- The Prime Minister and the Cabinet should be aware that the Tak Bai issue in 2024 could easily escalate into a political crisis and push the Prime Minister and her team into facing one of the most challenging tests in public administration.

- The 20th anniversary of the Tak Bai case presents a different perspective, viewing it as a problem that has transitioned from Shinawatra the father to Shinawatra the daughter.” The challenge posed to Thaksin’s government in 2004 is mirrored in the challenge facing Paetongtarn’s government in 2024, which may even be more daunting.

- The final unclear question is how coalition parties perceive this issue. Do coalition partners view the Tak Bai case merely as a problem for the Pheu Thai Party and are they willing to let the Pheu Thai Party confront the Tak Bai issue in isolation? Party members and individuals in government positions are facing this challenge with significant solitude.