The ideological evolution of Hamas

The Palestinian armed resistance group, Hamas, has been thrust into the international spotlight after the events of October 7, when fighters associated with the outfit stormed Israel in unprecedented fashion, and Tel Aviv launched a brutal counter-offensive that continues.

Most of the Western media has been quick to brand Hamas as an anti-Semitic terrorist group, with some linking it to the Nazis (if anything, Israel most faithfully resembles the Third Reich in its cruelty), while others comparing it to the self-styled Islamic State terrorist group (IS considers Hamas ‘apostates’). Others still consider Hamas an Iranian cat’s paw in the region.

While the group was once close to Tehran, part of what Iran dubs the Mahwar-i-Muqwamat (the Axis of Resistance), the two sides drifted apart after the Syrian civil war, with Tehran supporting Bashar al Assad’s regime, and Hamas backing the opposition. However, a reconciliation of sorts was achieved after Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was assassinated by the Trump administration in 2020, and Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political head, travelled to Iran to condole the general’s death.

Today, Hamas seems to have rejoined this axis, as vocal Iranian support for its ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’, and harsh condemnation by Tehran of Israel’s murderous forays, illustrates.

But beyond the mostly Eurocentric media framing, what exactly is Hamas?

The group, founded during the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 by wheelchair-bound cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (who was assassinated by the Israelis in 2004), broadly consists of a political wing, a social services wing and a military wing, the Ezzeddin Al-Qassam Brigades (named after the early 20th century Palestinian cleric and freedom fighter of the same name who fought both the British colonisers and Zionist settlers).

It was the Al-Qassam Brigades that spearheaded the October 7 assault. The name itself is an acronym for Harkat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiya, or the Islamic Resistance Movement.

The first covenant

Hamas released its first covenant in 1988, detailing its ideology, aims and goals. The covenant was updated in 2017, 30 years after the group’s founding in Gaza.

The 1988 document consists mostly of religious rhetoric, heavily interspersed with ayats of the Holy Quran, as well as hadith. But there are also clear hints of Palestinian nationalism and pan-Islamism.

A major problematic aspect of the founding covenant is that it often conflates Judaism and Zionism, which has been picked upon by pro-Israel critics of the group. However, the 2017 document is much more moderate, perhaps reflecting a change within the group’s thinking over the decades.

In the 1988 covenant, the group’s relationship with Hassan al-Banna, founder of the pan-Arab, pan-Islamic religio-political movement Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (known as the Muslim Brotherhood in the West) is highlighted right at the beginning of the document, just after verses from the Holy Quran are cited.

It says that “The Movement’s programme is Islam” and that “the Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem [sic] Brotherhood in Palestine”, (all translations taken from Yale University’s Avalon Project website).

Moreover, Hamas observes that “Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious”, yet later in the same document, states that “Under the wing of Islam, it is possible for the followers of the three religions — Islam, Christianity and Judaism — to coexist in peace and quiet with each other.”

In the group’s view, Palestine is essentially Islamic land: “It is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the sovereignty of Islam in this region”. At another place, it is mentioned that “the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day.”

Nationalist currents

Apart from the Islamist foundation, the original covenant of Hamas also includes nationalist language when it says that “Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed” and that “The Movement assures all the nationalist trends operating in the Palestinian arena for the liberation of Palestine, that it is there for their support and assistance”.

Surprisingly, the 1988 document speaks of the Palestine Liberation Organisation with an almost filial reverence when it says that the PLO “is the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement. It contains the father and the brother, the next of kin and the friend. The Moslem does not estrange himself from his father, brother, next of kin or friend. Our homeland is one, our situation is one, our fate is one”, though there is the quid pro quo that the day the PLO “adopts Islam as its way of life, we will become its soldiers”.

This day never came to pass, as was witnessed decades later when the left-leaning and secular Fatah, a key component of the PLO, clashed with Hamas over control of the Palestinian territories in 2007. The result of that fratricidal conflict was that Fatah retained power in the West Bank, while Hamas maintained its power base in Gaza.

There is also a nod to pan-Islamism, as the covenant says that Hamas “views other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation”. Furthermore, in the eyes of the movement, the only way towards Palestinian liberation was through armed struggle: “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.”

The document also recognises the role of women in the liberation struggle when it observes that “the Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the Moslem man in the battle of liberation.”

A new age, a new covenant

By 2017, when Hamas updated its covenant, much water had passed under the bridge. The Oslo Accords of 1993, signed between the PLO and Israel, had failed to bring peace to Palestine or liberate the occupied territories, while in 2000, the Second Intifada had broken out.

By this time, Hamas had grown from an armed resistance movement to a political entity, governing Gaza after Israel had vacated the strip in 2005, and Hamas had won the majority of seats in the 2006 Palestinian elections. However, as mentioned above, due to Palestinian infighting, Hamas remained in charge of Gaza, while the PLO-led Palestinian Authority ran the West Bank.

Perhaps its experience running a government, and dealing with a variety of international actors, made Hamas alter its charter, and soften its stance on several issues. The document retained its Islamist tone, yet the language critical of Jews in the 1988 document was shed, and the group’s chief target was now Zionism.

The 2017 document (translation by Middle East Eye) terms Palestine as “a land that was seized by a racist, anti-human and colonial Zionist project”. At the same time, it offers a broader notion of Palestinian nationhood: “The Palestinian people are one people, made up of all Palestinians, inside and outside of Palestine, irrespective of their religion, culture or political affiliation.”

The enemy, according to the 2017 covenant, is not the Jew, but the Zionist: “Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.”

Again, a more moderate Islamist tone is adopted when the document noted that “Islam … provides an umbrella for the followers of other creeds and religions who can practice their beliefs in security and safety. Hamas also believes that Palestine has always been and will always be a model of coexistence, tolerance and civilisational innovation”, while observing that “Islam is against all forms of religious, ethnic or sectarian extremism and bigotry.”

And while the group insisted that “a fully sovereign state … established with Jerusalem as its capital” was its goal, there was some flexibility on the geographical contours of this state in the new document: “Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.”

And, in many ways reflecting the legendary ‘olive branch and gun’ speech PLO head Yasser Arafat had given at the UN General Assembly in 1974, in the 2017 document, Hamas upholds the right to armed struggle, while keeping the door open to dialogue.

“Hamas rejects any attempt to undermine the resistance and its arms”, while adding that “the liberation of Palestine is a legitimate activity, it is an act of self-defence.” But while refusing to bid farewell to arms, the document says that it is willing to manage “Palestinian relations on the basis of pluralism, democracy, national partnership, acceptance of the other and the adoption of dialogue”.

Welfare work, foreign affairs

One of the major factors behind Hamas’ popularity in the occupied territories is its large web of welfare activities, particularly in regions such as Gaza with high poverty and economic stagnation — a direct result of the Israeli occupation.

Being as it is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has a thriving welfare network, there was a ready blueprint Hamas applied in areas it operates. For example, the group runs schools and clinics, along with organising cultural activities and giving stipends and food aid to widows and orphans. The group’s extensive experience in running charitable institutions also came in handy when it had to run the government in Gaza.

As mentioned above, one of the factors that likely resulted in Hamas’ re-evaluation of its charter is that after it became Gaza’s governing entity, it had the opportunity to deal with an increasing number of foreign actors (though the Palestinian Authority was and remains the international community’s principal liaison).

Where state actors are concerned, Hamas has an on-again, off-again relationship with Iran (at the current time the relationship is definitely in the ‘on’ mode) as well as Syria, where its politburo was located before the relationship soured following the Syrian civil war. Hamas’s foreign political headquarters then shifted to Qatar, and the wealthy Gulf emirate is considered one of the group’s key foreign state allies. There was also outreach with Russia at one point, with Hamas delegations visiting Moscow. And while during Mohamed Morsi’s rule over Egypt (2011-2013), ties were cordial, as the then Egyptian president was a Brotherhood member, the relationship quickly soured after Egypt’s military coup, as the generals cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, and all the group’s allies, foreign and local.

Right now, amidst the heat of conflict, especially when there are calls from Israel and its Western allies to crush Hamas, a reductionist view of the group is prevailing — one that paints the outfit as a violent agitator — the killing of Israeli civilians on October 7 being billed as the latest example of their violent tendencies.

Given the complexity of the Israel-Palestine conflict, if and when Palestine achieves statehood, historians will be in a better position to judge Hamas’s contribution to the Palestinian freedom struggle.

Qasim A. Moini

Dawn

Asia News Network