The Bhumjaithai Party is currently regarded by political pundits as the most powerful and influential group in Thai politics. The strategic manoeuvring by Newin Chidchob, the party’s so-called headmaster, has been nothing short of masterful. From a marginal position earlier in the year, they have regained power within six short months.
At the beginning of the year, Bhumjaithai was showing a distinct lack of strength. The Constitutional Court had ruled 7 to 1 to end the ministerial status of Saksiam Chidchob, the former Minister of Transport, for retaining ownership of Buri Charoen Construction. This led to a key party leader stepping back.
As a result of this case, a complaint was filed with the Election Commission to dissolve the Bhumjaithai Party immediately because the court found Saksiam guilty of using a nominee to hold shares in Buri Charoen Construction before donating money to Bhumjaithai, causing significant disruption within the party.
Rumours circulated that many Bhumjaithai MPs were secretly aligning with Pheu Thai, negotiating with prominent local figures in various provinces to join the red camp.
The slow pace of evidence gathering by the Election Commission compared to the speed at which it was looking into dissolving the Move Forward Party raised suspicions. It remains to be seen how the Commission will rule.
What is certain is that the Blue Camp, with its 70 lower house seats and at least 159 upper house seats, now wields significant political leverage. With 229 parliamentary seats, they hold more power than any other party.
Although their 70 lower house seats are fewer than Pheu Thai and Move Forward, Bhumjaithai can change the political landscape at any time. By allying with any party, they have the potential to form a government.
The headmaster of the Blue Camp would prefer the party to be the second-largest coalition partner, staying in a safe zone to join forces with other political parties as needed. Meanwhile, the 159 upper house seats will support the Blue Camp's mission, preventing rivals from ousting them.
The influence of the upper house can shake the administration, as seen when Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin faced challenges from the former 40 senators of the Prayut government.
How the headmaster and his Blue warriors will negotiate their political power is well worth watching.
Especially notable is the negotiations with Pheu Thai, given the past animosity between the Headmaster and Thaksin Shinawatra. Despite their history, political interests have forced them to cooperate.
The focus will be on ministerial positions as the Blue Camp's increased leverage allows them to negotiate for more ministries, particularly Transport, which the Headmaster aims to reclaim.
During their four years in the Prayut government, Bhumjaithai's single ministry yielded significant results and also bucked the trend by increasing its MPs.
In contrast, the Ministry of Interior, though powerful in terms of authority and local government cooperation, did not meet the Headmaster's expectations and was difficult to manage due to entrenched bureaucratic resistance.
Other ministries are also worth watching as the Headmaster strategizes to strengthen the Blue Camp further.
Significantly, several Bhumjaithai policies that Pheu Thai initially blocked are now making a comeback. Notably, the cannabis policy has been reinstated. Health Minister Somsak Thepsuthin attempted to reclassify cannabis as a narcotic, but due to the strengthened position of the Blue Camp, Pheu Thai leaders had to back down and instead introduce a law on how cannabis is controlled.
Attention must now be paid to Pheu Thai's policy to raise the minimum wage to 700 baht per day by 2027. This falls into the jurisdiction of Bhumjaithai, which controls the Ministry of Labour.
At the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, the Labour Ministry proposed a minimum wage increase to the Cabinet, resulting in a 2-16 baht per day raise, with the highest increase reaching 370 baht per day in Phuket. This fell short of Pheu Thai’s goal of 400 baht per day.
This left Prime Minister Srettha and Pheu Thai dissatisfied because if the incremental increases are insufficient, reaching 700 baht per day by 2027 will be unattainable.
It is therefore evident that Bhumjaithai's labour policy does not align with Pheu Thai's objectives. With increased political leverage, it remains to be seen who will compromise.
Moreover, the passing of key legislation in parliament must be monitored, especially the Amnesty Bill. If Pheu Thai includes Article 112 offences in the Amnesty Bill, it might pass the House of Representatives but face obstacles in the Senate if the Blue Camp senators do not approve.
Similarly, crucial government legislation, such as the annual budget bill, financial laws, and other important bills requiring Senate approval, cannot be ignored. The Blue Camp has the power to decide the fate of these laws.
The resurgence of the Blue Camp, which now controls both the upper and lower houses, necessitates careful observation of new coalition deals, particularly with Bhumjaithai. Otherwise, it may complicate the political manoeuvres of the Big Boss and the Prime Minister. Forget about ousting them from the coalition government.