Navigating between principles and interests

KUALA LUMPUR - US media triumphantly reported the invasion of Afghanistan as liberation. US reporters “embedded” in Bush’s Iraq invasion force enlightened the world only from one side.

When Putin sent his army on “special operations” in Ukraine, he had no such luck. Global mainstream media is overwhelmingly Western, so Russia could not win the PR war.

Broadcast media format focuses on the event of military action to the near-total exclusion of the issues behind it. The result is the simplistic perception of the Kamala Harris type: invasion bad, Russia bad; Ukraine pitiful, West good.

Satellite pictures of a 64km Russian military convoy heading for Kyiv promoted anti-Russia outrage. Sympathy for Ukrainian evacuees added to the partisan sentiment.

Much can be learned from an invasion, its lead-up, the aftermath – and the opportunistic posturing of big powers.

The West thinks if Russia gets away with this invasion, China will be encouraged to invade Taiwan. But Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi both reject such silly comparisons.

Every situation is different and baseless assumptions only confuse. Ukraine and Taiwan have little in common beyond bipartisan US support.

The West believes China’s assertiveness over Taiwan and the South China Sea could mirror Russia’s strike. Instead, Beijing’s years-old moves resemble Nato’s “salami tactics” of phased encroachment.

Still, Western diplomats want the world to condemn Russia without considering many contexts.

Those are two items on their wish list, not one.

In seeking international endorsement, they say it is not just a “white man’s problem.” When self-interests replace historical context, any problem can be everyone’s problem.

They say such invasions had ended with WWII, but the developing world still suffers them – often by Western design. The Third World’s problems are not a white man’s problem.

Ukraine is the West’s latest proxy and the first European hostage in a Cold War that Nato never ended. Welcome to the Third World, Kyiv.

Principles are important for peaceful and stable world order. Non-aligned nations have their principles as much as major powers have extra-territorial interests.

The West suspects Russia duped China into a “no limits” partnership weeks before the invasion.

But in the days prior Russia repeatedly asked the US for written security guarantees, only to be snubbed.

Those guarantees could have avoided the invasion, but to retain the strategic initiative Nato stubbornly refused. It meant Nato could grant Ukraine membership whenever it chose and Russia should have no say whatsoever.

Putin promptly retrieved the initiative by placing Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert. That need not mean going nuclear, only that escalation by nuclear-armed Nato would see Russian retaliation – so Nato rejected a no-fly zone and Polish MiG-29s for Ukraine.

Russia may learn that invading Ukraine is not the best possible option. Overtly attacking a neighbour is seldom the best way to ensure one’s long-term security.

Even if Zelensky’s government is removed, more Ukrainians may now clamour for Nato membership. That would raise the stakes to a more alarming level.

Ukraine may learn it should have declared formal neutrality earlier, pre-empting Nato’s encroachment onto Russia’s doorstep. Seeking Nato membership earlier would not have helped when Nato expansion had already alarmed Moscow.

Russia could learn of more cost-effective ways to tame Zelensky’s Ukraine, already a basket case poised to disintegrate into a failed state with the right economic pressures.

Moscow could cripple Kyiv without dramatic images of mayhem and destruction – prime-time news cannot fully capture the impact of an economic implosion. No Nato member, post-pandemic, is inclined to throw Ukraine a sizeable economic lifeline in perpetuity.

That economic route could have provided China a bloodless lesson on Taiwan policy. Taiwan is no basket case, but its economic success also means greater dependence on continued growth and stability amid deepening integration with mainland development.

Nato may learn a lesson from the recent US pullout from Kabul, leaving prized weapons in the Taliban's hands. Nato’s arms transfers to Ukraine may see the same fate when Kyiv falls.

Similarly, US arms sales to Taiwan may have the same result when reunification with the mainland happens sometime, somehow. Such inadvertent transfers of military technology are immediate when they occur.

Taipei may want to check if the US Taiwan Relations Act means anything more than buying US arms. Last December Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin linked it to “Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.”

By early March, Western experts were amazed to find much of Ukraine’s airpower intact. They immediately credited Ukraine’s resilience and staying power.

Russia may just be limiting damage to Ukraine’s military assets for its use and study.

Zelensky has appealed to Washington for fighter aircraft and Stinger missiles while Europe is already supplying Javelin missiles and others.

Has the West learned to avoid provoking conflicts by curbing strategic expansion eastwards?

That seems unlikely as the Quad alliance seeks new partnerships in the notional “Indo-Pacific”.

East Asia is a richly nuanced region that Western powers seldom appreciate and rarely understand. ASEAN has already signaled indifference to the Indo-Pacific concept while Asian Quad members India and Japan have non-Western interpretations of it.

ASEAN may not condemn Russia any more than it did the US when it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq at greater cost and lesser provocation. Like Non-Aligned Movement stalwart India, ASEAN countries can disapprove of invasions in general without taking sides.

ASEAN has weathered tougher challenges without compromising its neutrality. If Western powers have their nuances, those now look like inconsistency and incoherence.

The US wants Russian exports banned, expecting non-Western countries to do it. But US extra-territorial demands are not UN sanctions and lack a multilateral mandate.

Germany will continue importing Russian oil and gas. Britain will also keep buying Russian energy for now without letting Russian cargo ships dock.

China has clarified its position in maintaining good relations with both Ukraine and Russia. The

West and Russia should clarify their interests, without demands or provocations.

Bunn Nagara
 
Columnist, The Star

The writer is a global policy analyst and Honorary Research Fellow of the Perak Academy.