Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra's government is facing pressure over negotiations on benefit-sharing in maritime territory claimed by both Thailand and Cambodia. The framework for the talks, the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed under Thaksin Shinawatra’s administration, has been criticised by political groups, academics, former military officials, and others.
Criticism claim the 2001 MOU puts Thailand at a disadvantage, as it supports Cambodia’s unilateral maritime demarcation, which does not align with international law and may ultimately lead to a loss of Thai territory in the future, especially around Ko Kut in Trat province.
Following the 2013 International Court of Justice ruling granting Cambodia sovereignty over Preah Vihear temple, the land border was set at Boundary Marker 73. However, this sparked a maritime dispute when Cambodia extended that claim southward past Ko Kut. Cambodia claims rights to the sea based on this line, while Thailand, citing international maritime law, draws a boundary around Ko Kut.
This has created an overlapping maritime area between Thailand and Cambodia, north of 141 degrees. But south of this line lies an area believed to be rich in gas and oil resources that both nations may need to jointly manage.
These issues are encapsulated in the 2001 MOU.
Both Thai political and security sectors agree that Cambodia claims maritime rights but not land rights. It is acknowledged, however, that during the era of General Lon Nol, Ko Kut was claimed as part of Cambodia.
A Royal Thai Navy source notes that during King Rama V’s reign, disputes over the Chanthaburi-Trat region were resolved by designating the land as private property of local villagers. This was a strategic move because, under international law, another country cannot make claims on private land.
“Ko Kut follows the same principle. Locals now fully occupy the area with private land rights, making it unavailable for foreign claims. This may offer some reassurance to the public,” the source said.
However, the close ties between the Shinawatra and Hun Sen families have led to suspicions of potential hidden conflicts of interest, drawing further scrutiny.
The Thai Defence Ministry made three recommendations to Srettha Thavisin’s government last year, following an agreement between the Thai and Cambodian prime ministers to jointly develop the Thai-Cambodian border economy: boost cross-border trade, reopen Preah Vihear, and negotiate the overlapping maritime area.
It is clear that the Defence Ministry supports benefit-sharing in the overlapping maritime area under the 2001 MOU framework. It agree with the government that Thailand’s natural gas reserves are currently limited and also depleted.
Additionally, Thailand and Cambodia currently enjoy positive relations at all levels — from prime ministers, ministers of defence, military commanders, and border troops to citizens of both countries. This presents a favourable opportunity for dialogue.
However, the Defence Ministry insists negotiations on benefit-sharing should proceed within the framework of the 2001 MOU. This should include clear delineation of the maritime boundary, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), with the area designated as a joint development zone. It stresses that “these two matters must not be separated”.
This reflects the ministry’s concern that the government might negotiate on maritime benefit-sharing based on the 2001 MOU without reaching a resolution on the maritime boundary itself.
As Paetongtarn’s government takes charge of the talks, this issue has resurfaced to dominate debate. Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai is setting up the new Thai technical committee on the overlapping claim and will chair its first meeting soon.
However, the process appears confined to a limited circle within the ruling Pheu Thai Party, with Phumtham yet to bring it before the Defence Ministry and military. So far, these agencies have only learned of developments through media reports.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa has tasked the ministry with compiling information on the 2001 MOU, maritime laws, and Thai-Cambodian benefit-sharing agreements. The stated goal is to address all public concerns and dispel confusion, easing political pressure.
For the benefit-sharing to succeed, Paetongtarn’s administration must address concerns of all citizen groups, particularly regarding border issues — a highly sensitive topic for many Thais, with the priority to avoid any perception of ceding territory.
Furthermore, transparency and clear actions are essential to dispel perceptions that close ties between the two countries’ leaders will influence national interests or raise conflicts of interest.
Otherwise, progress on benefit-sharing will be hampered by political uncertainty. The prime minister’s approval ratings remain stagnant, and decisions on various issues have only intensified existing crises, potentially undermining the government’s stability.