How Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ treads a fine line between the West and Russia

Since Vietnam adopted its program of reform (“Doi Moi” or renovation) in 1986, its foreign policy has transitioned from one driven by ideology to a more pragmatic regime driven by independence, self-reliance, diversification and multilateralism. This is underpinned by four principles: Not engaging in military alliances, not supporting any country against another, not allowing foreign military bases on its territory and not using force or threatening to use force.

In 2019, in the context of the Ukraine conflict, a defence white paper elevated these four principles to strategic “guiding rules” in the safeguarding of the fatherland.

But this was just an update of principles declared in the middle of the last decade by Vietnam’s former leader, the late Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. These principles were the foundations of bamboo diplomacy, which he defined as: “Strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches”. They stand for upholding moral standards and core values, while quickly adapting to shifts around the globe.

The way Vietnam has approached the conflict in Ukraine is a particularly strong example of bamboo diplomacy at work. When the conflict began, Vietnam made a show of respect for its long and close relationship with Russia by abstaining from five United Nations General Assembly votes on the war. It also voted against suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council.

Three weeks after Russia attacked Ukraine, on March 15, 2022, the Vietnamese foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, called his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. He expressed his hope that the two sides could reach a long-term resolution.

Since then, the two countries have maintained close and high-level relations. Vietnam has received visits from, among others, Lavrov, as well as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko and Dmitry Medvedev, a close Putin ally. Most notably, Putin met with Vietnamese President To Lam in Hanoi on June 20. The pair pledged to pursue closer ties.

The two countries are exploring deepening cooperation in several areas, most notably in the military, energy and research fields. These included the participation of Vietnam in the Russia Army Games in 2022 and the 2023 agreement to create the Nuclear Science and Technology Centre in Dong Nai, as well as agreements on continued cooperation in oil and gas geological exploration and exploitation. Vietnam also sent delegates to last year’s 27th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

At the same time, Vietnam has reached out to Ukraine to express sympathy and solidarity. Bui Thanh Son called Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba on March 16, 2022, a fortnight after Russia attacked. He assured Kuleba that Vietnam prioritized independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states above all other considerations.

The Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, met Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in May 2023 at the G7 summit and in January 2024 at the World Economic Forum. The Vietnamese president and Communist Party general secretary, To Lam, also met with Zelensky, alongside European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen during a working trip to the US in September.

He repeated his country’s support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations. He further said Vietnam was ready to contribute to promoting dialogue toward the restoration of peace and would be willing to work with the international community to support the reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. Vietnam has contributed to humanitarian aid efforts for Ukraine, including sending food, as well as offering scholarships to Ukrainian students affected by the war.

The war in Ukraine has placed Vietnam in a delicate position diplomatically. Along with Thailand, Vietnam is a staunch ally of the United States in Southeast Asia. This is particularly important when it comes to security cooperation in response to China’s growing influence in the region. At the same time, Hanoi has ties with Moscow going back to what it refers to as the “American war” in the 1960s and 1970s.

Washington was frustrated by Hanoi’s abstention from the UN Ukraine votes, but at the same time was mindful of the importance of the relationship between the two countries. US President Joe Biden made a state visit to Vietnam in September 2023, after which the two countries announced they were elevating their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The White House said this aimed to reinforce the “strength and dynamism of the US‐Vietnam relationship as both countries work together to achieve our shared goals of peace, prosperity and sustainable development”.

To Lam returned to the visit in September 2024 when he attended a session of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Hanoi has also largely cooperated with sanctions enforced against Russia. However, it has been reported that Russia and Vietnam have been talking about restoring the arms trade between the two countries, which was discontinued after the war. It’s understood that the issue was on the agenda during Putin’s state visit in June, but thus far there has been no announcement of a shift in policy that might threaten Western sanctions.

Vietnam must walk a difficult line in its relations with both countries, and the war in Ukraine is the most sensitive issue Hanoi has to navigate. Russian companies remain heavily involved in Vietnam’s energy sector, which is a vital interest for Hanoi. But at the same time, Vietnam is wary of Russia’s friendship with China, which means maintaining warm relations with Washington.

How all this might be affected by any change in policy brought in by the incoming Trump administration remains to be seen. But throughout the three-year war, Vietnam’s adept use of “bamboo diplomacy” has meant it has been able to be as flexible as is required in such a difficult situation.

Thi Kim Quy Hoang

The Jakarta Post

Asia News Network

The writer is a PhD researcher at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. The article is republished under a Creative Commons license.