Relations with major powers shake-up the status quo

During the first quarter of this year, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity signalling the country’s dramatic shift of strategic engagements with major powers outside the Western alliance.  

The nearly year-long chilly state of the Thai-US alliance has unexpectedly inspired Thai military leaders to explore new and more encompassing relations with other power brokers. Gone are the days when the Thai military found unwavering support from Washington in the face of common security threats and uncertainties.

This outreach approach will intensify further as recent attitudes of the US and the EU have demonstrated. They are still sceptical about to the recent lifting of martial law — a demand they made constantly since the coup due to their criticism of the imposition of the interim charter’s Article 44, which they deemed even more dictatorial.

This has immediately squashed hope for any improvement in relations. After previous coups, no attempts were initiated to reach out to others, as diplomatic isolation was short-lived and amid a more sanguine strategic landscape. Thai military leaders were also confident of American support. Now all that has evaporated — leaving general malaise and ill feeling.

As expected, there is a strong sense of wariness among the military top brass about “the damned if you do, damned if you don’t” attitude of the US and EU. From now on, they will further strengthen friendship and cooperation with countries that do not shun them. China, India, Japan, South Korea and now Russia are top priorities. Japan and South Korea are strategic US allies that have not boycotted Thailand.

In more ways than one, the 24-hour visit by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was a diplomatic coup for Washington’s biggest rival in instituting a new strategic rapport with its oldest ally in the Asia Pacific. The visit came hot on the heels of two other high profile visits — China’s defence chief, Chang Wanquan and India’s National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval — in less than two months. Both returned home with new initiatives and cooperative security frameworks with Thailand.

Medvedev struck a good rapport with Prayut after they first met in Nay Pyi Taw during the East Asia Summit last October, which quickly led to the stopover last week. In the second half of this year, to increase comfort levels and signal burgeoning Thai-Russian ties, there would be an exchange of high-level visits to their capitals by Prayut and President Vladimir Putin, along with possible future arms deals. Obviously, Medvedev’s visit helped to heal the rift caused by the extradition of Viktor Bout, the notorious Russian arms dealer, to the US in 2010 under the Abhisit government.

Second, it signals the country’s will?ingness to engage “non-traditional” major powers.  Apart from economic and cultural issues, Thailand is discussing and forging closer security cooperation with China, Russia, India and Japan with gusto. Truth be told, the Thai military are increasingly dissatisfied with the security architecture designed by the Western alliance after World War 2.

What is notable is the new Thai approach of self-interest is it at odds with the US rebalancing policy that has been the hallmark of Obama’s administration on Asia. Thailand remains the only US ally still mute to the US “pivot”. Indeed, the country has lost out to neighbouring states due to their increased US strategic values. Washington no longer sees Bangkok as a lynchpin of its security tie-ups Southeast Asia.

Third, Thailand has long pursued a diversification of arms procurement in past decades – but it was done in a gradual manner, avoiding disruption to US-led interoperability. However, emerging new security cooperation agreements and talks on numerous arms sales show that this process is accelerating. But it remains to be seen what will transpire, in the long-term, whether such deals will challenge the Thai-US security alliance.

With land-based security threats moving to the maritime domain, Thailand is also eager to implement its first comprehensive maritime strategic blueprint (2015-2021) and its naval forces are beefing up defence capacity to protect vast marine resources and territorial waters both in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand.

Several countries including Germany, China and South Korea are interested in selling submarines to Thailand. China is on top of shortlisted suppliers. Followed the lifting of a five-decade ban on arms exports, Japan has also joined the race citing past relations and affordable loan packages. In the 1930s Thai destroyers, torpedo boats and two submarines were built by Japan.  

Judging from work still to be done in the junta’s road map and recent emerging rhetoric, it seems highly likely the current power wielders will stay on to deal with a swag of issues related to political reforms during this crucial transitional period — some of them so sensitive they are left unspoken.

As such, prospects of immediate improved relations with the US and EU look to be slim in the foreseeable future – unless, there is a new assessment of the Thai situation. With the outgoing President Barack Obama focused on building his legacy and the mounting EU domestic turmoil, Thailand is very much off their radar.

Non-Western power brokers have recognised the importance of Thailand due to its geostrategic importance and location, as well as opportunities created by the immobilisation of ties with the US. They can make inroads into the yet-to-emerge regional security architecture. So far, China has been able to merge both economic and security interests to fit into this window of opportunity. In whatever circumstance, if it remains open for an extended time, it will have an impact on the US plan to build a regional order.